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H
ouse prices in the United States have soared over
the past five years. A common measure of the
trend in house prices is the repeat sales index
produced by the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise
Oversight. According to this measure, between 2001:Q1
and 2005:Q3, U.S. house prices increased by an average
of 40 percent in nominal terms and 29 percent relative to
the consumer price index (excluding the shelter compo-
nent of the index). This rapid appreciation has led some
analysts to forecast a correction in real house prices—
possibly even a decline in nominal prices.
A decline in house prices would reduce household
wealth, which could restrain the growth of consumer
expenditures and overall economic activity. Mortgage
default rates could increase sharply if a decline in house
prices were accompanied by slower growth of household
income or rising interest rates. Furthermore, a decline in
house prices would reduce the value of collateral behind
the $8 trillion residential mortgage debt market and would
thereby increase the losses lenders experience on loan
defaults. The popularity of nontraditional mortgage loans,
such as interest-only loans and adjustable-rate loans that
permit negative amortization (“option ARMS”), raises
additional concern about default risk because such loans
expose borrowers to more interest-rate and house-price
risk than traditional fixed-rate, amortizing loans.
How exposed are banks to residential real estate? As
a share of their total assets, commercial bank holdings of
residential real estate loans and securities have risen
markedly since the mid-1990s. For example, between
1999:Q1 and 2005:Q1, the sum of bank holdings of 1-to-
4-family residential real estate loans and the market value
of their holdings of mortgage-backed securities (excluding
those issued or guaranteed by a government agency or
government-sponsored enterprise, such as Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac) increased from about 15 percent of total
bank assets to nearly 20 percent. More comprehensive
measures that include all residential real estate loans show
similar increases in exposure, as does the ratio of untapped
home equity lines of credit to total bank assets.
These simple exposure measures provide little informa-
tion, however, about whether banks today are more vulner-
able to a decline in house prices than they were in the past.
Although the share of bank assets consisting of residential
real estate loans and securities has increased since 1999, so
too has bank equity-capital relative to total bank assets.
Between 1999:Q1 and 2005:Q1, equity-capital increased
from 8.5 percent of total bank assets to 9.9 percent of total
assets. Because capital serves as a cushion against loan and
security losses, the increase in real estate loans and securities
as a share of bank assets is less worrisome than it would
have otherwise been.
The national averages, of course, mask considerable
variation across banks in their holdings of residential real
estate loans and securities and in their capital-to-assets ratios.
One might assume that risks are greater for banks located
in regions that have seen the most rapid house price appre-
ciation. Loan-to-value ratios have tended to be lower in
such regions, however, suggesting that the mortgage market
may have adapted to a possibly higher risk of house price
declines in those states. Further, the growth of the mortgage-
backed securities market and proliferation of interstate
branch banking may have reduced banks’ exposure to local
real estate shocks by facilitating greater geographic diver-
sification of their real estate loan and securities portfolios.
Finally, a portion of the residential real estate loans and
securities held by banks are guaranteed by third parties,
and many banks purchase only highly rated securities that
have little credit risk. Thus, to get a complete picture of
how vulnerable individual banks are to a decline in house
prices, we need to know more about the composition of
their real estate loan and securities portfolios. 
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